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v                                                               Abstract                                                                    .
France is a country that has an enormous need for uranium to run both its commercial
nuclear power plants and provide material for its military nuclear weapons program.
France would not purchase the uranium it needs on the global market because Charles de
Gaulle and other French leaders wanted France to be independent both militarily and
economically.  Foreign sources of uranium such as Canada and Australia were either seen
as being under the influence of the United States or as an unreliable source.  France also
had extensive influence in Africa because of colonies it held there.  De Gaulle used
methods such as creating new ministry offices, proposing military defense and technical
agreements, and creating a special monetary zone to retain French authority when these
colonies became independent.  When uranium was discovered in Niger and Gabon, both
former French colonies, France now had a reliable and controllable source of uranium.
France intervened militarily in these countries whenever the French leaders felt their
supply of uranium was in danger.  French policy towards her former African colonies
was affected by the French need for uranium.
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1                                                             Introduction                                                                .
The Fifth French Republic was officially created on September 28, 1958, but the French
view of the world and how they fit into it is a result of actions that have occurred long
before that date.  Past events in French history such as the defeat in the Franco-Prussian
war, the events of World War I, the abandonment at Dunkirk and the events of World
War II, the Suez crisis, their humiliation in Indochina and the rebellion in Algeria are just
a few of the many events that have not only molded the French into what they are today
but also have plotted the course of French policy since the creation of the Fifth Republic.
All of the above mentioned events are not only well-documented, but also their effects on
French foreign policy are easily understood because of the extensive research and
examination done on those events and their aftermaths.  Harder to examine and qualify
are the other types of things that have shaped French policy, the desires and needs that
French leaders have felt, insisted, and even demanded France have.  This Thesis intends
to be an in-depth examination of one such French desire, not only the cause for the desire,
but also how the desire was fulfilled, and whether or not the fulfillment of the desire
shaped French policy.  This Thesis will examine France’s need for uranium and the effect
that need had in forming French foreign and domestic policy, specifically, France’s
foreign policy towards its former African colonies.
French involvement in Africa began long before any of the events mentioned
above.  Obviously France did not become interested in Africa for its uranium, because
uranium had not even been discovered when France made her first foray into the African
continent.  The reason why France invested so much in Africa is tied to some of the
events mentioned above and will be examined.  Eventually, France became the most
dominant European power in Africa.  France also held on to its colonies in Africa longer
than any other colonial European power.  When France finally gave the African colonies
their independence, it continued to be extensively involved in a majority of its former
colonies.  The French believed they had a “special” relationship with these former
colonies, one that was mutually beneficial to both the French and the former colonies.
But what did France stand to gain from continued financial, military and international
support of their former African colonies?
The answer to the above question is tied into the French, and in particular Charles
de Gaulle’s, desire to be militarily and economically independent from foreign nations,
especially the superpowers.  One aspect of this desired independence was not to rely on
the Americans or Soviets for help in developing military and civilian uses of nuclear
energy.  French leaders felt the need for the French to be the sole protectors of France,
not part of conglomeration of defense forces that might once again abandon France.  The
easiest way, de Gaulle and the other leaders determined, was to develop nuclear weapons.
It was in the aftermath of World War II that France began to investigate
harnessing the atom for civilian uses.  The expertise France gained with its civilian
nuclear program soon turned to military uses of nuclear energy.  Today, France generates
over seventy-five percent of her energy from nuclear power and maintains a something
2on the order of 450 nuclear weapons for her defense.  To run this considerable amount of
nuclear power and weaponry requires a significant source of fissile materials, specifically
uranium.  France exhausted most of her supply of readily extractable uranium while
undertaking exploration and mining activities in its colonies in Africa.  The only colonies
that had suitable amounts of uranium available were Niger and Gabon.  When granting
independence to its former colonies, France now had a classic quandary, how to get a
reliable supply of the special material it needed from Niger and Gabon at an acceptable
price.  The Thesis will examine the methodology France used in those former colonies to
make sure that the flow of uranium did not stop.
This Thesis will also examine several pivotal events involving the French in
Gabon and Niger.  It will analyze each event, determining the cause of the event, the
French role within the event, and the benefits/detriments of the outcome.  Some of these
events include French military interventions into these two countries, especially the
French intervention in the 1964 coup in Gabon.
The picture that will be painted is one of the French desiring a rare resource that
had been discovered in some of her former colonies.  Rather than having to rely on an
unstable world market, France would continue to influence and intervene in those
countries in order to make sure the country had all of the uranium it needed to keep up
with its civilian and military needs.  The French policy towards its African nations might
not have been neocolonial in actuality, but it was almost undoubtedly a patron-client
relationship.
In the last decade, the French policy towards its former colonies in Africa has
begun to change.  This change has taken the form of reduced military actions and a
reduction in the amount of economic support provided.  There are many reasons for this
change in policy, one of which is the lack of need for France to get certain raw materials
from those countries.  With the new willingness of the French to procure their uranium on
the world market, France no longer solely needs to depend on its former colonies.
3                                   France and Nuclear Energy                                             .
To say that France is dependent on nuclear energy would be an understatement.  Over
35% of France’s total energy requirement and over 78% of French electricity demands
are met by nuclear energy.  In 1999, France generated 375 billion kWh of electricity from
its fifty-eight pressurized water reactors currently in operation. The electrical generation
capacity of these plants is 65,702 MWe.   France also operates one fast reactor, which
generates 250 MWe of energy
1.  Because of their large operation capacity, the French
also export energy, mainly to the rest of Europe, roughly 72.1 TWh per year.  This large
amount of energy generation allows France to be more energy self-sufficient than most
European countries.  In fact, France is over 50% able to meet its own energy needs, an
incredibly large percentage for a modernized, western country.  In comparison, Italy is
only 18% energy self-sufficient.  This was one of the goals of the French Nuclear
program, to decrease French dependence on foreign energy sources2.
The French national energy company, Electricite¢ de France or the EDF, runs
France’s nuclear power plants.  The EDF was created in 1946 to alleviate the energy
shortage that occurred just after World War II.  In the 1950s the EDF provided France
with the energy to modernize itself into an industrial power.  However like most energy
corporations, the EDF relied heavily on hydrocarbon generation up until the first oil crisis
occurred.  Then it was decided that the EDF should pursue nuclear energy to reduce
French dependence on foreign energy3.
The first French commercial nuclear power plant had already been commissioned
by 1963.  Since then, France has built an impressive and yet relatively young group of
reactors.  The average age of a French reactor is only thirteen years.  With a nuclear
power plant life expectancy of forty years, this means French nuclear capabilities have a
definite future ahead of them.  This also does not take into consideration the possibility of
plant life extensions or other means of adding to the viability of a nuclear plant.  In
addition to the current number of nuclear power plants, France also has four more plants
under construction and due to be added to the generation grid in the year 2001.  The
oldest active French nuclear power plants went critical in 1977 and 1978.  The minimum
expected, forty-year lifespan of these plants indicates their shut down in the years 2017
and 2018.  Currently, France has six new power plants planned.  These plants are
scheduled to begin their commercial operation in 2014, conservatively estimated to pick
up the load from the plants shutting down at this time4.  This shows that not only is
France currently relying on nuclear energy, but it also plans to have nuclear energy be its
primary energy source far into the future.
In order for nuclear power plants to operate, they must have a fuel source.  The
French company COGEMA meets France’s nuclear power plant fuel needs.  COGEMA
was founded after the EDF and at the beginning of France’s nuclear power era.
COGEMA is now an industrial group that is majority owned by the French government.
In fact, the French Atomic Energy Commission owns 82% of the shares of COGEMA,
with the other shares owned by an oil company and an engineering firm.  In the fiscal
4year 1999, COGEMA had sales in excess of five billion US dollars, this coming mainly
from the sale of uranium fuel for reactors.  It services 25% of the world market for
uranium enrichment and conversion, 50% of the world’s fuel reprocessing facilities and
over 80% of the world’s MOX fuel fabrication.  In the year 1998, COGEMA
manufactured 6100t of uranium into fuel assemblies, which is 18% of the world
production for that year.  Over 40% of COGEMA’s annual production of uranium is
exported from France5.
In its natural form, uranium is concentrated after mining as yellow cake, which is
primarily uranium oxide (U3O8).  For enrichment, it then must be converted into the form
of uranium hexaflouride,UF6.  From this state, it has to be enriched primarily by one of
two methods, either gaseous diffusion or gaseous ultracentrigfugation.  This takes the
0.71% U-235 content of natural uranium and increases it to the 3-5% range that is
necessary in order to run light water reactors.  After enrichment, the uranium must then
be fabricated in UO2 pellets, which are then made into fuel assemblies
6.  It is the fuel
assemblies which are loaded into nuclear power plants.  COGEMA is involved with all
the above processes.  It owns substantial interests in uranium mining operation around the
world.  COGEMA operates two plants in France for the conversion of yellow cake to
uranium hexaflouride.  In addition, COGEMA owns the Georges Besses uranium
enrichment plant in France, which has the capacity to enrich almost one-third of the
world’s annual uranium supply.  Finally, COGEMA and FRAMATOME (the French
nuclear reactor design and construction company) jointly own several fabrication plants
around the world.  These FRAGEMA plants currently have 32% of the production
capacity of the world’s PWRs7.  Through COGEMA, France has the ability to produce
the uranium needed to run its arsenal of nuclear power plants, as long as there is natural
mined uranium available.
Since the beginning of the nuclear power era in France, the French have mined
their uranium, almost to the point of exhaustion.  Please see Figure #1 one on the
subsequent page for a plot of average uranium produced per year in France.  This plot
was calculated using data from the various Redbooks produced over the years by the
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and the IAEA.  The plot shows the average uranium
produced in France per year for the year groupings shown.  Currently, over 70,000 metric
tons of uranium has been excavated in France.  This leaves the French with uranium
reserves of around 200,000 metric tons.  However, this uranium ore is of very poor
quality and is not economically feasible right now to excavate.  French nuclear power
industrialists have thus turned to other sources around the world for uranium.   One of the
closest and easiest places for the French to obtain their uranium was their own African
colonies.  Of particular interest were Niger and Gabon, both of which have extensive
uranium deposits8.  COGEMA realized this and had bought extensive right to several
mines in those countries.  In Niger, COGEMA owns 57% of the SOMAIR mining
operation and 34% of the COMINAK mining operation. In Gabon, COGEMA owns
68.4% of the COMUF mining operation. In addition, COGEMA own 100% of the Cluff
mining operation in Canada, 71% of the Christensen Ranch mining operation in the
United States, and 3.3% of the Ranger mining operation in Australia9.  Moreover,
COGEMA is involved with new production at five different mining operations in Canada
5and is the primary motivator in some recent studies of the feasibility of uranium mining
in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Mongolia and Madagascar.  Through all of these various
sources, COGEMA is assuring France and its clients that it can obtain uranium and
thereby supply fuel assemblies for nuclear power plants10.  Because COGEMA is so
widely diversified in its uranium acquisition, it has made France less dependent on a
particular foreign source for its energy needs.  COGEMA’s recent spread into other
markets for uranium comes at an opportune time.
Originally, the COGEMA drive to obtain uranium focused mainly on the
countries of France, Niger and Gabon.  It is only recently that COGEMA has turned to
other sources, such as Canada, the US and Australia, to obtain its uranium.  This is
mainly due to the fact that its uranium fountains have dried up in France and Gabon.  The
French natural uranium status has already been mentioned but the status of the mines in
Gabon has not11.  COGEMA owned the majority share in the COMUF mining operation
in Gabon that mined the Mouana region.  In the 40 years that the COMUF mining
operation was in production, it mined over 26,650 metric tons of uranium.  However, as
of 1999 it ceased to produce uranium and was scheduled to be remediated, then
decommissioned by the end of the year 2000.  This will completely exhaust the
COGEMA mining operations in the country of Gabon.  In the country of Niger where
COGEMA owns two mining operations, the SOMAIR and the COMINAK, production is
becoming unstable.  For the year 1999, these mines produced around 3000 metric tons of
uranium, which is half of COGEMA’s production for the year.  But the economic
situation of Niger is very difficult and thus Niger is not as reliable of a uranium source as
it used to be12.  COGEMA has begun to diversify itself into other uranium markets
because of the difficulties it has found in obtaining uranium from its historical uranium
supply.
Figure #1- Average Production of Uranium in France vs. Time.   
Source:  Uranium 1999-1975 Resources Production and Demand.  Nuclear Energy Agency 










7                                               French Colonialism in Africa                                                 .
The first significant French colonial military foray into Africa occurred in Algeria in
1830.  The French king at the time, Charles X, sent his army to occupy the town of
Algiers in response to the dey of Algiers striking and calling the French consul names.
The invasion eventually led to the announcement in 1848 that Algeria was part of the
republic of France, making Algeria the first French colony14.  This led to the eventual
creation of one of the largest and longest lasting colonial empires in history.
While this initial excursion into Africa was intended to be an act of revenge, the
purpose for continued French expansion into Africa quickly changed to increasing French
prestige, both abroad and in Europe.  Towards the end of the nineteenth century, French
colonies began to appear across the entire globe.  However because of fierce competition
with other European colonizers, much more of France’s expansionist energy was being
spent in Africa rather than other parts of the globe.
As France started to expand its colonial role, two major factions sprang up at
home; the first favored continued expansion while the other renounced it.  The
proponents of French colonization in Africa believed that France could increase her
perceived power in Europe by increasing French presence and authority abroad.  The
anti-expansionist French believed that the money, time and effort being spent on
colonization would be better utilized protecting and entrenching French interests in
Europe.  However, the pro-expansionists eventually won over the minds of the French
political elites who decided France’s course15.  Thus, colonization would not only occur
but would increase.
Perhaps the largest factor that influenced and increased French colonial ideals and
efforts was the French defeat at the hands of Germans in the Franco-Prussian war of
1870.  After this demoralizing defeat, and the consequent loss of the valuable territories
of Alsace-Lorraine, French officials realized that one way to win back the support of the
French people was to envision France as it “should be.”  In fact, Chipman states that,
Charles Renouvier, a popular French philosopher at the time, believed that France’s
defeat in 1870 was due to the “loss of the ideals of freedom and backwardness in the
pursuit of science.”  Renouvier encouraged Frenchmen to believe in a new ideal, based
upon morality and reason, which could be found in the idea of civilization.  French
leaders quickly adopted this, making it an “official doctrine of the French State,” thereby
making it an integral part of how France defined her power in the international arena.
The idea of spreading civilization soon became the official reason for further
French colonial acquisitions.  In fact, “mission civilisatrice” as it soon came to be known
in France, was intended to spread French culture, thereby increasing French influence
abroad.  Another result of this increasing influence abroad, was increased authority in
Europe.  The idea of raising up others to the French standard and way of life was such an
endearing one to the French population that mission civilisatrice soon became the rallying
cry for French expansionism right up until decolonization16.  However, the idea did not
8die there.  Instead it became one of the factors that led to France’s almost neocolonialistic
policy towards its former territories in the post WWII years.
Using mission civilisatrice and another new idea called rayonnement, which
literally means lighting the way for others, France expanded its holdings in Africa to
include the present day countries of Algeria, Morroco and Tunisia.  These made up the
French colonies in North Africa, which most Frenchmen considered more prominent than
the French holdings in Black or Sub-Saharan Africa.  France was also the primary owner
of colonies in West Africa, had some holdings in Equatorial Africa and held the present
day country of Gabon.  These were the primary area of France influence in Africa.
It was within these colonies that France began to pursue a policy of assimilation.
This assimilation ideal, based upon the concept of mission civilisatrice, was aimed at
making the citizens of the colonies an “integral part of the mother country.”  In effect, the
French tried to make Africans into model French citizen without any regard for the
culture and history of the indigenous peoples17.  Eventually, this idea of assimilation was
replaced with a more realistic goal of association.  Association was the idea that
Frenchmen would try to instill French pride and love of the mother country in Africans
without forcing them to abandon all native ideas and culture.  Ironically, assimilation
would not work because colonial administrators feared forcing people to become French
would produce resentment and revolution; and those same French administrators made
association also unsuccessful because of very heavy-handed and sometimes brutal direct
ruling of the colonies18.
Despite the attempts at assimilation and association, the average African colonial
did not think of themselves as part of the French empire.  Nor did the average French
citizen think much of their African counterparts.  This changed with the advent of World
War I.  During the Great War, the French colonies supplied over 500,000 soldiers to fight
in the trenches in Europe and over 200,000 workers to keep war industries running.  By
supplying troops, workers and raw materials to defend the French Empire, the colonies
had begun to prove themselves useful.  This silenced many of the French critics who had
believed that the colonies were a waste of resources19.  More important was the beginning
of the integration of France’s African colonies into the mainstream French empire.
After the war, two new terms arose in France and Europe to describe relations
with Africa.  These terms were France-Afrique and Eurafrique.  France-Afrique was
described as “the need to ensure that African materials and human resources could be
developed to meet France’s needs.”  On the other hand, Eurafrique was explained as the
idea that Europe could co-operate in Africa and that France could lead European
activities in Africa because of massive amount colonies owned by the French there20.
The frequent use of these terms shows the beginning of increased beliefs that both
France’s and Africa’s futures were linked together and that French colonies in Africa
were becoming more important in French society and in Europe.
9                            French Colonialism In Africa Post-WWII                               .
The beginning of the end of French Colonialism in Africa resulted from Charles de
Gaulle coming to power in and the creation of the Fifth French Republic in 1958.  In fact
in a quote from an interview with a US ambassador to Gabon and Jacques Foccart, whom
is considered the father of France-African relations, Foccart states:
General de Gaulle foresaw political independence in 1958.  The General viewed
the Community as a step in the process rather than an end in itself.  De Gaulle
anticipated granting independence in 1965 or 1966; the fact that independence
came only two years after the formation of the Community surprised the General.
The Community that Foccart spoke of was the second of two plans de Gaulle had in mind
for French African colonies in the post World War II era21.
Initially, de Gaulle had tried to force the African colonies into two separate
conglomerations, one consisting of those colonies in West Africa and the other of those
in Equatorial Africa.  This plan was resisted and eventually evolved into the Communaute
or Community.  De Gaulle envisioned the member states of the Community as believing
in one president (the president of France), one senate and one nationality.  The president
would have decision-making powers over such critical areas as defense, economy,
foreign relations, currency and the procurement of strategic minerals22.  The nation-states
would have a large amount of internal power, but submit and bend to the will of the
president.  Every former colony of France in Africa except for Guinea accepted and
embraced the terms of the Community.  Incidentally, Guinea was completely cut-off from
all French aid and to this day the debate still rages over whether this course of action or
those taken by all other French colonies was better23.
However, as the quote above mentions, it was a very short time until the member
states of the Community began to demand their own independence.  After 1960, only
Djibouti remained a colony of France while all other Sub-Saharan holdings had become
independent.  In what became one of de Gaulle’s legacies to France, he made the
continuation of strong relationships with the former African colonies a primary concern.
This “special relationship” with the former colonies was preserved even after de Gaulle
left office.  In fact it has continued well into the 1990’s and only recently has it begun to
fade.  Thus, de Gaulle concentrated his efforts on keeping France as the primary
influence in Africa while also making sure that the former colonies were independent
enough to satisfy themselves24.  To this end, de Gaulle pushed for and ended up with “co-
operation” agreements with every former French colony in Africa, except Guinea of
course.
In order to facilitate of the needs of these “co-operation” agreements with the
numerous former colonies, de Gaulle created the Ministry of Co-operation in 1961.  This
ministry was specifically designed to be distinct from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
This was intended to show the former African colonies that they were not going to just be
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viewed as nations, but as nations with special ties and relationships with France25.  In fact
the Ministry of Co-operation was only the first of many steps taken by France to ensure
that it would have continued influence over its former colonies after their independence.
One special status that former African colonies of France have is in the
economical realm.  After World War II, the French created the Franc Zone to help the
burgeoning economies of its African colonies.  The Franc Zone consists of a currency co-
operation agenda between France’s Ministry of Treasury and fourteen African countries.
In fact, the Franc Zone, which uses a currency called the CFA franc, is regarded as, “The
first pillar on which France rested its neo-colonial structure.”  The Franc zone’s design
was to incorporate three major elements: first the ability to easily transfer funds; second
the ability to easily convert currency at a fixed rate in the zone; and finally to centralize
all of the monetary reserves of the African colonies in one location, namely the French
Treasury.  Because of these elements the Franc Zone gives three main advantages to its
constituents: one, an increased amount of currency stability which results in decreased
inflation rates; two, a direct conduit that allows foreign trade; and three, it increases the
amount interdependence that the African countries have due to the common currency26.
On the other hand, the Franc zone did have some drawbacks.  These drawbacks
mainly stemmed from the fact that the CFA franc, as time went on, became more and
more overvalued.  This in turn caused massive trade deficits in the African countries and
was a fiscal drain on the French budget.  This increasing overvaluation of the CFA franc
finally resulted in a devaluation of the currency by 50% in 1994.  This devaluation was
devastating to the economies of the African countries that depended on the CFA franc but
was necessary to appease the IMF and World Bank27.  The French Treasury has
continued and most likely will continue to play a pivotal role in the administration of the
Franc Zone because it allows the French to retain some economic ties to their former
colonies and it is a prime factor in making the former colonies achieve some kind of
economic reform.
While there were other institutions created in order to continue de Gaulle’s plan
of French-African interdependence, none were as effective and as long lasting as the
Ministry of Co-operation and the Franc Zone.  These were the primary tools used to
influence the former colonies and bend them to the will of the French.  However, de
Gaulle also used military interventions in order to show the African colonies and the
world that just because France did not have colonies in name, she was still protecting,
controlling and using her former colonies.  Interestingly, most of the interventions
presided over by de Gaulle came after a dramatic decrease in French soldiers stationed in
Africa.  Due to the monetary requirements of the creation of its nuclear weapons program
and because the training and outfitting of African military forces produced suitable
replacements, France reduced its conventional forces in order to not exceed its military
budgets.  This is evident by looking at the number if French soldiers stationed in Africa
in 1962, which was approximately 70,000 and then examining the number stationed in
Africa in 1964, which had dropped to approximately 21,000.  The decrease did not end
here, because by 1970 there were only 6,500 French military members stationed in
Africa28.
11
While the French continued to decrease its military presence on the African
continent, it did not shirk away from its responsibilities, both perceived and actual, via its
defense agreements with the former colonies.  In fact the reduction in military presence
coincided with the creation of a special military command whose sole purpose was fast
reaction and deployment to Africa whatever the need may be.  In practice, the French
military forces that were active in Africa under de Gaulle’s tenure were mainly used to
defend African governments that were being endangered by revolutionary movements.
De Gaulle sent in French troops to aid governments in Cameroon in 1960-1961,
Mauritania in 1961, Gabon in 1962, Congo in 1960 and 1962, Chad between 1960 and
1963, Niger in 1963, and following a brief period of non-intervention, missions in 1967
in CAR and 1968 in Chad29.  Perhaps the most astonishing military action that occurred
under de Gaulle was the French support of the separatist Biafrans in Nigeria in 1968.
During this rebellion, the Biafrans tried to secede from Nigeria and take with
them the primary oil-producing region of Nigeria.  France, and de Gaulle in particular,
viewed the splitting of one of the major powers in Africa as a good thing, and encouraged
the Biafrans by sending them food, supplies and weaponry.  The Biafran secession
eventually was defeated and the conquered territory taken back.  This occurred in 1970,
shortly after the resignation of de Gaulle, partly because of his support of the Biafrans,
and the appointment of Georges Pompidou as President of France.
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                                 French Involvement in Gabon                                            .
France was not the first European to take an interest in and control of the territory that is
the current day country of Gabon.  Before the French became involved, what is now
Gabon was visited and partly occupied by both the Portuguese in the 1400’s and 1500’s
and later the Dutch in the 1600’s.  However, tempted by the gold, ivory and precious
wood trade, the French soon began to establish a sphere of influence in Gabonese
territory.  Just like all the other European powers at this time, France’s interest in Gabon
then became concerned with the slave trade30.
After decades of conflict with Great Britain over naval activities along the coastal
waters of Africa, France still entered into the Treaty of Vienna in 1815.  This treaty,
which prohibited the slave trade, led to the French Navy being deployed along the coast
of Gabon to interdict slave ships.  Not only did these anti-slavery patrols disrupt the slave
trade, they also protected legitimate French cargo ships from attacks from the coastal
residents of Africa31.  The presence of these French naval vessels led to the first
permanent presence of France in Gabon.
During the naval patrolling, several French officers signed alliances with local
chieftains, thereby gaining tracts of land where French forts and re-supply bases could be
located.  In fact, slaves freed by a French naval vessel went on to found (under the
direction of the French) the town the town of Libreville in 184932.  The founding of
Libreville gave the French control of much of the coastline of present day Gabon.
The French were content with their holdings of this portion of the coastline of
Africa for the next 40 years.  During this time there was economic competition between
France, Great Britain and Germany.  However, neither Paris nor London felt that the
Gabonese territory was valuable enough to fight over, so the conflict remained economic,
and not military.  It took the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian war and the subsequent
loss of the rich territories of Alsace and Lorraine to motivate the French to explore the
interior of Gabon33.
After many attempts, French explorers finally mapped out the interior of Gabon in
the mid-1880’s.  The official creation of the colony of the French Congo occurred in
1885.  The French then enacted several laws making any trade that did not occur under
the French flag illegal34.  Gabon remained titled the French Congo up until 1910 when
it’s name changed to French Equatorial Africa or AEF (Afrique Equatoriale Francois).
This change lumped Gabon with several other French African colonies, who were all
controlled by one governor.  The next development for Gabon was the loss of financial
independence in 1934.  This was followed by re-separation back into its own colony, with
its own governor, in 1937.  The next to last change in the colonial status of Gabon came
in 1946 when it was awarded financial independence35.
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The decision to give the colony of Gabon financial autonomy and its own
administration was the result of the Brazzaville Conference.  Charles de Gaulle adjourned
the conference in 194436.  However, it was not until 1946 that the French citizens passed
a national referendum that gave Gabon representation in the French National Assembly
and its own spot in the French Empire37.  It was during this time period that Leon Mba
first gained notoriety in Gabonese politics.
Initially appointed by the French into a minor position of power in Libreville,
Leon Mba soon came into conflict with the French clergy in Gabon, who viewed his
association with Bwiti tribesman and religious figures as a challenge to their secular-
derived influence in the territory.  He was consequently imprisoned for three years; but
after his release became a civil servant in Brazzaville where his fame grew38.  Upon
returning to Libreville, Mba consolidated his power and became the first Gabonese
elected mayor in 1956.  Using the prestige from his election, Mba allied himself with
some other key Gabonese political figures who were not necessarily welcomed by the
French, but rather tolerated39.  The result of Mba’s political machinations was the
eventual position of president of the Gabonese council of government40.
Gabonese independence from France did not occur until after the Algerian
revolution of 1954 to 1962, the return of de Gaulle to power, and the establishment of the
Fifth French Republic in 1958.  One of Charles de Gaulle’s first acts was to offer a
referendum to the French colonies in Africa41.  This referendum put to the colonies the
question of continued membership in a French Community, which was similar to the
British Commonwealth.  As noted above, Gabon voted for membership in the new
French Community.  France openly welcomed its new territories into this
conglomeration, but as previously mentioned, punished Guinea for their refusal42.
The leaders of Gabon witnessed the effects in Guinea of losing French support
and openly declared their desire to remain part of the French Community.  However, de
Gaulle’s brainchild was not to last long. On August 13th, 1960, Gabon became politically
independent with Leon Mba elected Prime Minister.  Mba, knowing his country could not
survive without French support, had initiated and signed fifteen cooperation agreements
with the French in the month before Gabon became autonomous.  These agreements
covered national defense, technical consideration, economic support, access to certain
materials and national stability43.  Coincident with the independence of Gabon happened
to come the first interest in the raw materials Gabon had to offer to the world, including
uranium and petroleum.
It was in 1961 that the Gabonese company COMUF (Compagnie des Mines
d’Uranium de Franceville) began to actively mine uranium in the Mounana region of
Gabon.  Production in the Mounana region stayed at around 500 tonnes per year for over
ten years before a sharp drop-off in 1972.  Production then steadily increased to a peak of
about 1100 tonnes per year by 1979.  Please see Figure #2 on the following page for a
plot showing the average production of uranium per year in Gabon.  This plot was
calculated using data from the various Redbooks produced over the years by the OECD
Nuclear Energy Agency and the IAEA.  The plot shows the average uranium produced in
Figure #2- Average Production of Uranium in Gabon vs. Time.   
Source:  Uranium 1999-1975 Resources Production and Demand.  Nuclear Energy Agency and  














Gabon per year for the year groupings shown.  The primary customer of COMUF is
COGEMA, the state run nuclear fuel company of France.  COMUF also supplies uranium
to Japan, Italy and Belgium45.
The burgeoning uranium and other industries that had begun to grow in Gabon
helped to consolidate Leon Mba’s power base.  Starting in 1961, Mba began to remove
any and all opposition to his regime.  The first to go was one of his old allies, Paul
Gondjout, who had first helped him get elected to the Gabonese council of government.
Through more political maneuvering, in 1964 Mba effectively removed the only
remaining threat to this power, his long time nemesis Jean Hilaire-Aubame.  This was
accomplished by Mba’s dissolution of the National Assembly of Gabon, his calling for
new elections, and his prohibition of anyone running who was not in his own political
party46.  However, this action proved too much for some in Gabon.
On February 17th, 1964, Leon Mba’s chief of staff, Albert Bernard (later Omar)
Bongo, informed the now President Mba of Gabon of some abnormal deployments of
troops and officers in Libreville.  Mba chose not to heed this warning and was promptly
ousted by a coup d’etat, which was led by several Gabonese military officers47.  Only one
day later, Jean Hilaire-Aubame was put in charge of a new coalition government.
However, Aubame’s rule was destined to be a short one, thanks to the French.
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                     French Intervention in the 1964 Coup In Gabon                               .
As previously stated, late in the evening on February 17, 1964, Leon Mba was ousted
from office and then detained, practically kidnapped, and held at various locations for
two days.  It took a French military intervention to return and restore Mba to power.  The
French justified the intervention under the enactment of clauses in the Franco-Gabonese
defense treaty48.  A closer look at the events that occurred during the coup d’etat paints a
different picture.
Once Mba and the rest of the national council were imprisoned and removed from
power, it was less than a day before the military leaders of the coup set up a provisional
governing council under the direction of Jean Hilaire-Aubame.  This council consisted of
several key Gabonese figures, including the only M.D. from Gabon and a famous
Gabonese actor49.  The provisional council ruled for less than another day because French
military forces then arrived in Libreville.
Interestingly, the information that the French received about the coup did not
come from the French Ambassador to Gabon, Paul Cousseran, but rather from Omar
Bongo, the Gabonese Chief of Staff.  Bongo informed the local French military
commander, which gave Bongo some standing with the French50.  The information
traveled up the French chain of command and resulted in the dispatch of French troops to
Libreville under the command of General Kergaravat.  The first fifty French troops
arrived at 10:50 AM the morning of the 18th of February.  More French troops arrived
throughout the day until more than 600 soldiers were located at the Libreville airport51.
These troops easily captured the provisional council at its headquarters but did face
resistance from the officers who initiated the coup.  These officers and their soldiers had
fortified the army base at Baraka and required a heavy pounding from ground and air
forces to be dislodged.  Eventually, they gave way to superior force and the coup was
over.   The total cost in human lives was 2 French soldiers, 25 Gabonese soldiers and
numerous civilian casualties52.  The effects on Gabon and on France in the international
arena are harder to quantify.
After the coup was defeated, Mba was located and restored to power by General
Kergaravat.  There were many demonstrations against Mba’s return to power throughout
Gabon, but the French military and the national police quickly quelled them.  Leon Mba,
however, turned very vindictive and ended up handing down (through the courts of
Gabon) several harsh prison sentences to those involved in the coup.  All of the surviving
Gabonese military officers involved received twenty years of hard labor.  The members
of the provisional government, including the doctor and the actor, received ten years
internment, while Mba’s old nemesis Jean Hilaire-Aubame received ten years hard labor
followed by banishment from Gabon53.  In the end, the elections promised before the
coup still happened; however with most of the opposition jailed the elections were hardly
fair.  Even with this advantage, Mba only won 50.38% of the vote, and it is very probable
that the elections were fraudulent in some locations54.  So Mba still retained power
despite the dubious nature of the whole incident.
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More interesting than the coup d’etat and its aftermath was the reason the French
intervened at all.  Barnes writes,
The French government justified its intervention as a legitimate response to a
request made by the Mba government for assistance under the terms of a mutual
defense pact concluded at the time of Gabon’s indepedence.  Mba explained that
Vice-President Paul-Maire Yembit requested assistance from the French
ambassador, Paul Cousseran, who relayed the request to Paris.
However, several sources indicate that Yembit’s request of assistance could not have
possibly occurred until the day after the French troops had landed.  This is due to the fact
that Yembit was not even in Libreville the day the coup occurred and was in fact visiting
a new Peace-Corps-built school with the American ambassador to Gabon, Charles
Darlington.
On the morning of February 17th, 1964, Charles Darlington and an aide left
Libreville, heading to N’Dende to officially open a school built by the Peace Corps.
Early the next morning he met with Vice-President Yembit, who was finishing up some
campaigning in the mountain regions of Gabon.  The Vice-President and Darlington then
gave speeches at the ceremony.  According to Darlington, the Vice-President and himself
parted ways at 12:15 PM on February 18th.  Obviously there is some contradiction here
because French troops had already landed before Yembit could have possibly contacted
the French ambassador55.  Darlington explains,
We know what the Vice-Presidents movements were after I left him on Tuesday
at 12:15 PM.  The fact that his appeal to France was made after all the troop
movement and all the shooting were over may raise questions in the minds of
some as to just how legal the French Government’s action was.  If it were not
legal, then I suppose it would have to be called an act of internal aggression.
So if the French decided to intervene on their own during the coup d’etat, what were their
possible motivations?
Overall, there are many reasons why the French would risk international
condemnation over their actions in Gabon.  Gabon was one of the most affluent of all of
France’s former African colonies, and it provided a large amount of income to the French
economy.  French investors had significant investments in Gabonese petroleum,
manganese, iron and wood industries.  Also at issue was Charles de Gaulle’s personal
affection for Leon Mba and his desire to see his old friend unhurt and restored to power.
However, the key reason for the intervention must be seen as France’s, and specifically,
de Gaulle’s, need to have access to the uranium that only Gabon could provide at this
time.  Charles de Gaulle needed the uranium that was being mined in Gabon in order to
develop and bring to fruitition his plans for the force de frappe.  De Gaulle desired
France to have nuclear capabilities independent from all other countries (which he could
not control), and to do this he needed the uranium that was mined in Gabon.  When
something threatened his supply, he sent troops in to defend it.  Similar sentiments are
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echoed by Darlington, “No other state possessed the uranium that de Gaulle needed for
his force de frappe, with which he planned to make France ‘independent’.”  Gardinier
writes of France’s intervention, “It definitely did so to protect French interests,
particularly the uranium, which was essential for securing an independent atomic
force…”  Decalo describes de Gaulle’s position thus, “feared the loss (to America) of
Gabon’s uranium, needed for France’s independent force de frappe.”  The parenthetical
(to America) begins to show why France did not want to rely on American uranium or the
uranium that France owned a share of in Canada.  The French viewed Canada as
acquiescing to any U.S. demands concerning uranium export or production.  The French
intervention in Gabon might not have been entirely about uranium, but a motivating
factor must have been de Gaulle’s plans for force de frappe.
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                              French Involvement in Niger                                                  .
While Niger became independent from France around the same time as Gabon did, it has
not seen the level of development and investment that Gabon has seen.  Niger was given
self-government by France in 1958.  Only two short years later, Niger was granted
independence from France.  On August 3, 1960, the French indirectly gave Diori Hamani
the Prime Minister position and his political party, the Parti Progressiste Nigerien or
PPN, gained predominance over the other main political party in Niger.  In only one year,
Hamani and the PPN managed to completely oust and exile this Union Nigerienne
Democratique party and give Diori Hamani complete control of Niger56.  This laid the
groundwork for the turmoil and strife that has plagued Niger ever since it became a
nation.
  
Without any serious political opposition, Diori Hamani easily won election to the
presidency of Niger in late 1960.  Niger and Hamani had an extremely close relationship
with France, and this resulted in continuing heavy French involvement in the country
after independence.  This contrasted with the gradual evolution of somewhat weaker
relationships between France and some of the other former French colonies.  France and
Niger also signed a defense agreement, one that allowed France to intervene in Niger is
the head of the state requested it.  In return, France got permission to have a garrison
located in Niamey.  In addition, France kept most of its governmental officials in Niger to
help run the new country.  It was very fortunate for Hamani that the French troops were
placed in Niamey because he was forced to call on them during his first term in office.
Given how Hamani came to power it was not surprising that he faced a military
uprising during his first term.  Late in 1963, one of the military companies station in
Niamey rebelled after discovering its commander was being transferred.  The uprising
was put down with help from the French forces stationed in Niamey.  Politically, the
action had no ramifications for France or Niger except for the fact that France once again
had intervened in one of its former colonies.  Less than a month later France intervened
in Niger again, this time to quell a border dispute between Niger and Dahomey57.  This
was to be the last French intervention in Niger, but not the last instance of instability in
Niger.
In the presidential election of 1965, Diori Hamani ran unopposed and won the
presidency again.  Five years later in 1970, Hamani again ran opposed and won re-
election.  It was at this time that the first uranium was commercially mined in Niger.
However, exploration for uranium in Niger had been conducted since before Niger’s
independence, suggesting that the potential for uranium production was known during the
aforementioned events.
In 1956, the French Commissariat a l’Energie Atomique (CEA) began exploring
Niger for uranium.  This task was taken over by COGEMA when the fuel company was
created.  The first commercial mining was in 1970 by the SOMAIR group and occurred
in the Arlit area of Niger.  Please see Figure #3 on the following page for a plot showing
the production of uranium in Niger.  This plot was calculated using data from the various
Figure #3- Average Production of Uranium in Niger vs. Time.   
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Redbooks produced over the years by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and the IAEA.
The plot shows the average uranium produced in Niger per year for the year groupings
shown.  The SOMAIR group is 37.5% owned by COGEMA with and additional
19.4%owned by the CFM in France.  Later in 1978, the COMINAK group began
uranium mining in the Akouta region of Niger.  COMINAK is 34% owned by
COGEMA59.  Both the COMINAK and SOMAIR mines continue mining operations to
this day.
During Hamani Diori’s second and third terms was when Niger began to have
increasing civil disobedience for a variety of reasons.  Starting in 1968, there was an
extreme drought in the Sahel region of Africa that lasted until 1974.  Because of its
length, this drought increasingly damaged the economy.  In addition, after lengthy
discussions with French officials Diori succeeded in removing all of the French soldiers
stationed in his country.  His goal in doing this was to gain more influence, and lessen
France’s, over the new burgeoning industries that had sprung up in the last couple of
years.  Without readily available French troops to quell dissent and during a severe
drought, civil tension was at a peak.  It was during this time in 1974 that strong rumors of
corruption began to circulate concerning the PPN and its senior officials.  The proverbial
straw that broke the camel’s back was the finding of several caches of food supplies and
other expensive items at several governmental ministers’ home residences.  This caused a
military uprising led by Lt. Col. Seyni Kountche, who replaced Hamani Diori in a coup
d’etat.  Diori was subsequently sent to prison where he remained until 1980.  Kountche
and his followers set up a Supreme Military Council (CMS) to rule the country60.  The
big question is why did France choose to not intervene militarily to restore Hamani Diori,
who was handpicked by and extremely loyal to France?  After all, under similar
circumstances a decade earlier in Gabon France had intervened forthwith.
The answer to the question of French inaction during and after the coup that
displaced Hamani Diori is probably one of bad timing.  The coup occurred in 1974 only a
few months after one of the surprise events of 1974, the sudden death of Georges
Pompidou.  Pompidou had won election in 1969 after Charles de Gaulle had resigned.
Even though Pompidou was a Gaullist, there was a marked decrease in the amount of
interest France had in Africa during his reign.  After Pompidou died, there was an interim
before the next French presidential election took place.  It was during this temporary
period of uncertainty in France that the coup that replaced Diori happened.  Chipman
thinks that, “French forces which might have been expected to support Diori, stayed at
home,” because of this unsure time in France.   The next French prime minister, Giscard
d’Estaing, was noted for leading France back into a more active role of intervention in
Africa61.  However, because of the lack of action by France in 1974, Diori remained
imprisoned and Kountche and his CMS remained in power in Niger.
Under the rule of Kountche and the CMS Niger has prospered but also faced
major internal problems.  In March 1976, Kountche defeated his first coup attempt, by a
former major in the Niger army, and all participators in the coup were put to death.
Another drought reared its head in 1978 and again caused civil disturbances.  Later in
1982, the government detained fourteen terrorists who were trying to damage the
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uranium mines at Arlit.  While the president of Niger was attending a Franco-African
summit in France in 1983, Kountche’s ministers had to put down another coup attempt.
Next, there was a conflict with Nigeria that lasted from April 1984 until March 1986
because the Nigerians shut down the border between the two countries.  Then in
December 1986, Kountche had a brain hemorrhage, which led to his eventual demise in
November 198762.  However, running the country of Niger would not get any easier for
his successor, Col. Ali Saibou.
One of the first official actions of the new head of state in Niger was the release
of most of the political prisoners that had been incarcerated during the previous
administration.  This did not however, placate the opposition for less than two months in
office; Saibou faced a political crisis when over 3000 students attending the University of
Niamey refused to attend classes for twenty-two consecutive days.  The students were
complaining about the decrease in state grants that the new government had instituted.  A
contrasting bright spot for Niger was the decision to draft a constitution which the Niger
national assembly began work on in July 1988.  The constitution was completed by
January of 1989 and sanctioned by the national assembly in September of 1989.  Thus the
“Second Republic of Niger” was born63.
Just because Niger had a brand new constitution, however, did not mean that the
country remained free from internal turmoil and strife.  In February of 1990 the students
of the University of Niamey again protested, but this time the government was not so
peaceful in its efforts to calm the people.  Instead, four students were killed and twenty-
five wounded, and the University was indefinitely shut down.  This did not stop the
students who returned to the demonstrations in April of 1990, which in turn resulted in
the arrest of over forty dissenters.  This time though, the students were not alone; for the
largest labor union in Niger, the USTN, protested with them.  To calm the mobs, the
government decided to hold meetings to examine the student and union grievances.  The
government did not move quickly enough to enact reforms because at the bequest of the
USTN there was a five-day strike across Niger, which effectively stopped the mining of
uranium and other crucial industries64.  The result of this strike was he announcement in
late November that in April of 1991 Niger would finally become a multi-party
democracy.
By April of 1991, there were over ten major political parties registered in Niger.
The first test of these parties strength was in the first free national election to be held in
February 1993.  In this election the candidates for president were narrowed to two, who
were then voted on in March 1993.  At this election, Mahamane Ousmane was narrowly
elected the president of Niger.  Even this civilian rule did not last long, coups occurred in
1996 and 1999, but finally a change back to a civilian government happened in December
1999.
Niger has been a country that undergone many changes since its independence
from France.  From its initial French set-up government, to its multiple coups and finally
the transition back to civilian rule, Niger has struggled to become a more developed
nation.  As to be expected commercial interest in Niger has been slow coming, due to the
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instability of the country.  Only the uranium industry has shown much consistency over
the years and even that is in decline.  The number of uranium workers in Niger has
dropped from over 3000 in 1990 to under 2000 last year65.  Niger will have to work to
discover new commercial enterprises in order to compete with other developing
countries.
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                          Charles De Gaulle and the Force de Frappe                               .
One of the predominate motivations for French policy toward nuclear weapons and
French international policy in general stems from Charles de Gaulle and his idea of an
independent nuclear striking force or force de frappe.  Initially, it was de Gaulle’s
Provisional Government that laid the grounds for development of nuclear weapons with
the creation of the Commissariat a l’Energie Atomique (Atmoic Energy Commission) in
late 194566.  This set the stage for later decisions by de Gaulle about France and her
defense strategy.
Charles de Gaulle firmly believed that France needed to remain politically
independent from all other countries.  He also believed that in order for a country to truly
remain independent it needed a strong defense force.  More importantly, the defense
force must also be independent.  To support this claim, Gough has quoted de Gaulle as
saying, “The defense of France must be French.”  It was this type of reasoning that led de
Gaulle to be a driving force for the independent development of nuclear weapons, even
when he was not in office, in order to have an independent nuclear force.
Charles de Gaulle was not put back into a position to lead France and the Fifth
Republic until June of 1958.  However, this does not mean he was not influential in the
dealings of French politics.  In fact it was at de Gaulle’s and a few other key military
officials’ insistence that France formed a committee to examine the feasibility of nuclear
explosives.  The same group of officials also proposed the building of a prototype nuclear
weapon and a prototype nuclear submarine.  The situation in the Suez and its aftermath
prompted the French government to speed up its plans to develop nuclear weapons.  This
acceleration took the form of the construction of a nuclear isotope centrifuge project for
separating isotopes and several nuclear development labs67.  The Atomic Energy
Commission had already constructed several experimental nuclear weapons by the last
months of the Fourth Republic. With all of these steps completed, France was set to
detonate its first nuclear weapon.
It is rather fitting that the person credited with starting the French nuclear
program was also the person to authorize the detonation of the first French nuclear
weapons.  Back in power again in 1958, Charles de Gaulle set the detonation of the
nuclear device for the first quarter of 1960 in the Sahara.  After the test was completed,
there was immense criticism at France and de Gaulle in particular.  This criticism
revolved around three central ideas.  The first was that France was not a prominent
enough nation to complete a strategically effective nuclear force.  The second was that
France was already protected by the US and NATO in particular.  The final criticism was
based on the general belief that there was no foreign country which was directly
threatening France alone68.  In addition, France broke a global moratorium on nuclear
testing that was in effect at the time.  Charles de Gaulle responded to these criticisms
with some of his most well-known and profound statements.
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In response to the attacks stating that France would never have comparable
nuclear program to those of the US and USSR, de Gaulle simply responded that France
will not need that many nuclear weapons.  During a press conference in July of 1964,
Berstein quotes de Gaulle as having said,
It is obvious that the megatonnes which we could employ do not match the
numbers which America and Russia could unleash.  But once a certain nuclear
capacity is reached and in regard to our direct defense, the size of the respective
arsenals does not have an absolute value.  For since a man and a country can only
die once, deterrence exists once one has the means to inflict mortal damage on a
possible aggressor, the determination to use them and the confidence in one’s
ultimate decision.
To his critics, de Gaulle was basically saying that the amount of nuclear weapons they
have would suit the defense of France and prevent any potential aggressors from
attacking.
The second charge against the French development of nuclear weapons was that
France and the rest of Western Europe were already protected by NATO and the US and
therefore did not need and independent source of nuclear weapons.  However, de Gaulle
had seen the lack of U.S. support during the Suez crisis and this and other historical
reasons led him to be reluctant about relying on U.S. for support.  Drawing on U.S.
action, or more precisely, inaction during the Suez crisis, de Gaulle was not going to rely
on the U.S. to bail France out of trouble if the Soviets attacked.  This fear of de Gaulle’s
was only reinforced with the announcement of the U.S. policy of flexible response.
Under this new policy, the United States and presumably, the U.S. led NATO would not
respond to a Soviet invasion with full-scale nuclear retaliation but with a more
proportional response.  This change in policy occurred in 1961 and left de Gaulle and
France fearing that the U.S. would use this new policy to abandon Europe and France in
the face of a Soviet attack69.  Charles de Gaulle believed that the U.S. was unreliable
when it came to the defense of France and used this belief as motivation for continues
nuclear weapon testing and development.
De Gaulle’s concerns about French political independence even with respect to its
own allies can be variously attributed to grand heritage from Charlemagne through Louis
XIV to Napoleon, the general’s own egocentric reaction to his marginalization during
World War II, and perhaps exaggerated emphasis on the exigencies of realpolitik.
Whatever the reasons for it, France’s single-minded drive towards nuclear independence
under de Gaulle and beyond clearly drove both its exhaustion of its cheaper domestic
uranium resources and its neocolonialistic policy concerning African uranium resources.
Ironically, as important as the perceived decline in the defensibility of France due
to the U.S. policy of flexible response was the actual decline in the defensibility of
France due to the French withdrawal from NATO in early March 1966.  There has been
much study into the reasons why Charles de Gaulle elected to remove France from
NATO and most scholars conclude that the primary reason for the French withdrawal
26
was due to de Gaulle’s and the majority of French leaders feelings that NATO and its
command structure really was just a way for the U.S. to be in control.  Chares de Gaulle
abhorred the idea of the French military and defense forces not being controlled by
Frenchmen and that led to several French proposals to try and change the structure of
NATO.  This is hardly surprising for a country with a long heritage as a dominant power,
e.g. as reflected in the strong difference between U.S. and Canadian attitudes towards
putting their own troops under foreign command.
Also attributed to the French withdrawal was increasing tension between the
United States and France over the French independent nuclear strike force.  It started with
a French General, General Norstadt, refusing to disclose to de Gaulle the location of
American nuclear forces stationed in France when de Gaulle returned to power in 1958.
De Gaulle responded by ordering the removal of all NATO stockpiles of nuclear weapons
from France.  After a speech by senior US government official Robert McNamara
denouncing independent nuclear forces at a 1962 NATO summit, de Gaulle withdrew
French naval forces from NATO70.  Finally, in 1966 France formally withdrew from
NATO and under the circumstances, the act came as no surprise at all.  Thus it was not
only French recalcitrance but also U.S. heavy-handedness on the question of an
independent French nuclear force as the final guarantor of the inviolability of the French
homeland that contributed to the French break with NATO.
The final criticism that the French received about having no country threatening
them and thus not having a need for nuclear weapons seemed ludicrous to de Gaulle and
the rest of France.  De Gaulle and the French military believed that because the two
world superpowers were at an impasse, that it made it more important for France to have
nuclear weapons in order to still have a voice on the global stage.  They also believed that
because their state had nuclear weapons, it could not be ignored during any conflict
where French interests were concerned.  Finally, the French did not build its weapons to
counter any known certain threat, but rather to counter any potential threat.  This shown
by a quote of de Gaulle’s in 1961, “I can only confirm to him France’s intention of
becoming a nuclear power.  For her, it is the only way of ensuring that no one can risk
killing her without risking his own death.”  This quote was in reference to discussion de
Gaulle had with John Kennedy about French nuclear designs71.  Overall, the French and
Charles de Gaulle were not too concerned with the thoughts of the rest of the world and
continued with their plans for the Force de Frappe.
Once de Gaulle and France were free from what they felt was American micro-
management of their defense forces, they began to construct the French independent
nuclear strike force.  Initially, the French military chose its Mirage IV bomber to be the
instrument of choice for the delivery of the nuclear weapons for the Force de Frappe.  In
1967, the Force de Frappe was officially created with sixty-two Mirages, each capable of
delivering a sixty-kiloton nuclear bomb.  Later in 1967 the first French nuclear submarine
was built.  In 1968 the French detonated their first hydrogen bomb in a new testing site in
the Pacific.  Before he left office, de Gaulle also started plans to replace the older Mirage
planes with newer ballistic missiles.  These missiles did not become operational until
1971, after de Gaulle had resigned, but they gave real power to the Force de Frappe
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because now the French nuclear submarines could launch nuclear missiles undetected and
the French ballistic missile sites were less susceptible to pre-emptive strike than the
Mirage planes had been72.  While de Gaulle did not remain in power long enough to see
the full potential of the Force de Frappe realized, he was instrumental in not only
creating it but also making it into a sizable independent military force.
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                      France, Australia, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty                      .
While it has been explained above why France chose not to obtain uranium from the
United States or Canada, those reasons do not apply to Australia.  Australia was distant
enough from the United States both spatially and politically that the U.S. did not have as
much influence over Australian decisions on uranium exports.  Australia has an
abundance of uranium for sale at prices lower than the cost of mining uranium in Niger
and Gabon, not to mention the cost of developing mining infrastructure in those
countries.  However, some reason kept the French from relying on Australia for the
uranium, and that reason is tied into France’s nuclear testing in that region of the world
and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
France aroused global anger by performing a series of above ground nuclear
explosions in the South Pacific in late 1995 and early 1996.  See Table #1 on the
following page for information on the series of French nuclear tests performed at that
time.  Moreover, France had been testing nuclear devices in the South Pacific for over
thirty years, and for countries located in South Pacific this has been an inflammatory
issue73.  One country in particular, Australia, instead of relying on rhetoric actually took
action against the French.  The form of this action was a type of economic boycott in that
Australia refused to deliver contracted uranium to France74.  Uranium had been
discovered in Australia right after World War II but it was almost thirty years before any
was exported.  In 1975, Australia commissioned a report to examine the issues
surrounding uranium mining in Australia and the issues surrounding potential export of
uranium.  After two years, the government in Australia agreed to proceed with
commercial uranium mining and exportation with some stringent safeguards.  These
safeguards were designed to avoid any attempts to use Australian uranium for non-
peaceful uses.  Incidentally, these safeguards have remained unchanged since their
inception and still exist today75.
Then in 1983 the Labor party came to power in Australia.  One of the first acts of
this new government was the creation of the “three mines” policy.  It was this policy that
authorized but limited uranium mining in Australia to three mines, namely the Ranger,
Naberlak and Olympic Dam sites.  All other proposals for uranium mines were
summarily set aside and not approved.  Shortly after the formation of the three mines
policy, the new Labor government took another, and more drastic measure that was a
direct result of the French nuclear weapon testing in the South Pacific, a ban on the sale
of uranium to France.
Before the creation of the three mines policy by the Australian government,
France had contractually agreed to purchase uranium from Queensland Mines Ltd., the
company which owned and operated the Naberlak mine.  After creating the three mines
policy, the Labor party in Australia then banned the sale of the ordered uranium to
France.  Instead, the Australians bought the surplus uranium and added it to their own
governmental stockpile.  Later in 1986, the ban was removed and Queensland Mines
began exporting uranium to France.  A year later, Electricite’ de France negotiated a
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Table #1-  Information on the Final Nuclear Tests Performed by France in Late 1995 and
Early 1996 at the Mururoa Test Site in the South Pacific76.
French Nuclear Test Number- This is the numerical number of the test as it corresponds
to all nuclear explosions tests performed by France.
Date of Test- Calendar date test occurred.
Time of Test- Time test occurred local testing site time.
Latitude of Testing Location- Latitude of the Muroroa testing site.
Longitude of Testing Location- Longitude of the Muroroa testing site.
Seismic Body Wave Magnitude- Value calculated from seismic data from event.  Used in
calculating yield.
Yield- Energy yield of the nuclear device in kt as calculated by the seismic data from
known independent sources.
Test Code- Event identifier number.
Number of Seismic Waveforms- The number of seismic waveforms recorded by seismic





























193 9/5/1995 21:29 21.850S 138.840W 4.8 5 kt 416284 716
194 10/1/95 23:29 22.250S 138.740W 5.4 40 kt 432410 1330
195 10/27/95 21:59 21.890S 138.980W 5.4 20 kt 448714 711
196 11/21/95 21:29 21.880S 139.030W 4.8 5 kt 468959 971
197 12/27/95 21:29 21.880S 138.970W 5.1 10 kt 522408 808
198 1/27/96 21:29 22.240S 138.820W 5.3 40 kt 556512 1053
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contract with the Energy Resources of Australia Ltd. (ERA) to obtain uranium from the
Ranger mine77.  This was not to be the end of this conflict between France and Australia
over nuclear testing in the South Pacific, however.
Once again, in 1988, the Australian Labor party moved to restrict the French
access to Australian uranium.  This time, the Labor party passed a resolution that would
prevent any more uranium contracts with France from being authorized.  On a side note,
the Labor party also revoked the three mines policy at this time and allowed the
possibility of new mines being developed at additional sites in Australia.  The resolution
concerning sales of uranium to France changed in September of 1994, when Australia
decided to deny any more uranium contracts with France only until France signed and
ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).  Even with a change in government
from the Labor party to a coalition government did not change the Australian stance on
this issue.
The next step in this progression was the decision of France to not only sign and
ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but to openly embrace it and become a major
proponent of it.  The announcement by the President of France Jacques Chirac on June
13th, 1995, that France would perform up to eight nuclear tests was packaged with the
decision that France would sign the CTBT.  Chirac claimed that French scientists needed
that data that the tests would provide in order to complete simulation and computer
software that would model nuclear explosions and allow French scientists to keep the
current French arsenal operational.  The French claim this data was needed before they
could sign the CTBT78.
So, France initiated five nuclear tests starting in late 1995 and ending in early
1996.  These tests caused riots around the world against French symbols such as French
embassies and cultural centers and a boycott of French wine worldwide.  The French
partially withstood the torrent of political wrath, capitulating and reducing the number of
tests from eight to five, and then began the process of signing the CTBT79.  On
September 10th, 1996, France officially ratified the CTBT.  France also agreed to halt its
refinement of fissile materials for weapons use.  In turn, Australia lifted the ban on
contracts with France for the sale of Australian uranium.  Less than three months later
Electricite’ de France negotiated a lasting contract for the procurement of uranium from
Western Mining Corporation Ltd. which operates the Olympic Dam mine.
French officials knew all of the issues surrounding the French nuclear testing in
the South Pacific and its effects on relations with Australia and other nations in this
region.  France knew that it could not rely on Australian uranium for the very reason that
it was testing nuclear device in Australia’s backyard.  This prevented France from relying
on Australian uranium meaning the French had to seek different sources of uranium to
keep French military and civilian nuclear programs running.  Thus, France had to turn to
Niger and Gabon.  In 1996, however, all of this changed, potentially removing a key
impediment to serious reassessment of France’s African policy.
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                                   Changes In French Policy Towards Africa                                     .
Over the last decade there has been significant changes in French foreign policy towards
its former colonies in Africa.  The most major change was the absorption of the French
Ministry of Co-operation into the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Other changes
include the reduction of French military and technical presence in Africa and the
reduction of economic benefits that France provides to her former colonies in Africa.
There are many proposed reasons for these various changes, but the fact that France need
no longer rely on Niger and Gabon for a significant amount of uranium cannot be
overlooked.
Perhaps the most major change in French policy towards Africa is the revocation
of the independent status of the French Ministry of Co-operation.   The French have
restructured their Ministry of Co-operation into something that the French say is more
appropriate to the increasing amount of globalization in the world.  Digging through the
French rhetoric, the new change involves the Ministry of Co-operation being absorbed
into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs80.  Thus, what was once a separate governmental
agency for strictly dealing with France’s foreign colonies in Africa is now lumped
together with the governmental agency that oversees all French foreign relations.  This
now puts the former colonies in Africa, who were once distinctly separated from other
foreign countries, into the same position as the rest of the world when it comes to French
foreign policy.
In addition, there has been a drastic reduction of French military and technical
personnel posted in Africa.  Militarily, France has planned to reduce the number of
French troops stationed in Africa from 8,000 in 1997 to 5,600 in 2002.  Corresponding to
this is reduction in French civilian personnel, who operate the various technical
agreements France has with her former colonies, from 7,669 in 1988 to 2,919 in 199881.
These reductions show that France has begun to pull back her interests from Africa.
French troops will no loner be stationed in Africa and as the technical agreements
between Africa and former colonies expire, the French civilians in charge of fulfilling
those agreements are returning to France.
In addition there was the French involvement in the genocide that occurred in
Rwanda in 1994.  There has been much debate over the amount of blame France should
accept over its role in the genocide82.  Ultimately, it was an attempt by France to provide
a clear distinction between the Francophone areas of Africa and the Anglophone areas.
In attempting drawing that line, France armed the Hutu forces that did the majority of the
killing.  While France would not have sold the arms to the Hutus if the French knew the
eventual usage of the weapons, it does not change the fact that the French supplied the
Hutu’s.  This type of politically damaging event is something which would not occur
now, with the creation of a unified European spokesperson and European defense force.
These unified commands will treat Africa with a common European policy towards
Africa, not just the French policies toward Africa.  The change from a distinct French
32
policy towards Africa to a common European policy towards Africa will lead to a definite
change in the relationship between France and her former colonies.
Finally, there has been a decrease in the level of economic support that France has
been supplying to its former colonies in Africa.  This decrease has taken the form of
devaluation of the CFA franc.  In January of 1994, the value of the CFA franc was
decreased by over fifty percent.  The French Ministry of Treasury decided to pursue this
devaluation in order to end the French involvement in the Franc Zone.  This was probably
necessary in order for France to become integrated within the forming European Union
monetary zone.  Without the separation of the CFR franc from the French franc, the CFA
franc would then be tied into the euro.  This could mean that European Union monetary
policy would affect Africa.  There is little motivation for the countries forming the
European Union to link their new monetary unit to Africa, it would put limits on the
fiscal decision making ability of the EU.  Thus the devaluation of the CFA franc and the
resulting split with the French franc was probably a necessary step for the monetary
unification of Europe.
The Franc Zone was another tie between France and Africa that was indicative of
the “special relationship” between France and its colonies.  Furthermore, the amount of
money that French Office of Developmental Assistance (ODA) has been given from the
French government has decreased substantially.  From 1995 to 1998, the budget of the
French ODA has shrunk approximately seven and a half billion francs.  The former
French colonies in Africa were the recipients of the majority of this money.  Thus, the
amount of developmental aid that the former colonies in Africa are going to receive from
France has also decreased significantly.  The change in the economic and financial
assistance that France gives to Africa is indicative of the change in French policy towards
Africa.
The reasons for the changes in French foreign policy towards Africa have been
explained in many different ways.  Some of the main reasons proposed include the deaths
of key figures that embodied the special relationship between France and Africa, the
international embarrassment the French received from their involvement in the Rwanda
genocide, and the creation of the European Union, which provided France with links to
countries in Europe that are stronger than the links between France and Africa83.
However, one reason that is easily overlooked is the change French desire for uranium
from its former African colonies, specifically Niger and Gabon.  In the last decade,
COGEMA has begun to diversify its uranium interests.  No longer does COGEMA solely
rely on obtaining inexpensive uranium from Niger and Gabon.  Now, COGEMA gets its
uranium from Canada, the United States, Australia, Niger and a little from France.  While
the French surely did not decide to pull back from Africa because they can get uranium
elsewhere, it was a factor in their decision.  Not having to depend upon Niger and Gabon
for uranium removed a potential stumbling block from the French withdrawal from
Africa.  While it was not a deciding factor, it probably played a significant part in
allowing the French to change their foreign policy in Africa.
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                                                               Analysis                                                                    .
Trying to determine how much French foreign policy in Africa was affected by the
French desire to obtain uranium is a difficult task.  There was no recorded decision by the
French leaders who formed the French African policy that can be related to uranium
extraction rates.  Instead the historical facts, rhetoric, and events and their outcomes must
be investigated.  By examining the history relating France to its former African colonies,
one can only surmise how much French foreign policy was influenced by the uranium
needs of the country.  Any such analysis revolves in a large part around Charles de
Gaulle.
If there was a key player that had shaped French foreign policy, not only African
but also all French foreign policy, then it had to be de Gaulle.  He not only helped to
build the Fourth Republic after World War II; he was instrumental in the construction of
the Fifth Republic.  All French leaders since de Gaulle have trod in his footsteps and
followed his lead on most issues, until at least very recently.  It was de Gaulle’s decision
that led France to first begin exploring nuclear power, with his establishment of the
French CEA in 1945.  The French CEA was the governing agency that not only brought
civilian uses of nuclear energy to France, but also allowed France to develop military
uses of nuclear energy.
However, de Gaulle’s influence on France and Africa did not stop with the simple
creation of the CEA or any government agency: he had a much greater impact.  It was de
Gaulle who realized that France was going to eventually have to release its colonies in
Africa.  It was de Gaulle who decided on a course of action that would not only ease the
transition of the African countries from colony to independent nation, but also would
allow France to keep some influence in these countries.  Thus came de Gaulle’s idea of
the Community.  Through the Community, France would lead its former colonies to
independence while also retaining some authority with these nations.  The Community
would not last long though.
With the collapse of the Community and the subsequent independence of most of
the former colonies, France stood poised to lose its influence over these countries.
However, under de Gaulle several long-lasting ties between France and these new
independent countries were established.  These ties took different forms but one of them
was the various defense and technical agreements between France and the colonies.
Another was a special French governmental office, the Ministry of Co-operation.  Instead
of lumping relations with the new African countries into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
de Gaulle created an entirely new Ministry office to handle the former African colonies
themselves.  However, this was not the largest string that attached France to her former
colonies.
Perhaps the most binding creation between the French and her former colonies
was the establishment of the Franc Zone.  This monetary conglomeration was tied into
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the French Ministry of Treasury.  The Zone allowed the newly developing countries to
have increased currency stability, decreased inflation rates, direct conduits to trade, and
increased the interdependence of the African colonies on each other.  However, what
were the advantages to the French that they would keep such an operation running,
especially with it being so draining to the French treasury?   Obviously, the French knew
that with the creation of the Franc Zone, they now had an extremely strong economic link
to these African countries.  Thereby, France could obtain the goods and raw materials
they desired from these African countries before any other countries had a chance to
purchase them.  While the benefits of the Franc Zone to the former African colonies were
enormous, the benefits that the French gained are not to be overlooked.
But the direct influence that he gave and the decisions that Charles de Gaulle
made on French foreign policy was perhaps his most lasting contribution to France and
her relationship with her former African colonies.  De Gaulle’s foreign policy towards the
rest of the world had been the subject of many books and articles.  One thing that clearly
resonates from all of de Gaulle’s actions, speeches and publications is his desire for
France to avoid dependence on other major powers.  He wanted France to not have to
rely on either superpower for defense, economic support, or bargaining power.  Things
that De Gaulle encountered before returning to power in 1958 only strengthened this
stance.  The lack of American support during the Suez crisis was only the first event that
de Gaulle witnessed that made him want to cut the ties between France and the US.
The next main event that deepened de Gaulle’s mistrust of the U.S. as an ally was
the change in United States’, and the U.S. dominated NATO, policy in case of a Soviet
attack into Western Europe.  The old policy had been one of massive retaliation, and the
French felt this was a great deterrence to any Soviet aggression.  However, under
President Kennedy, the U.S. changes to a flexible response scenario that would only
punish the Soviets with a proportional response to their invasion.  France and de Gaulle
felt like this policy allowed the United States to abandon France if the United States felt
this was necessary.  This was one of the major events that led de Gaulle to the conclusion
that France must build her own defense force.
Furthermore, de Gaulle felt that NATO was no more than a convenient cover that
allowed the United States to be in control of foreign country’s military forces.  De Gaulle
and the rest of France felt that Frenchmen, and not Americans, should control the French
military forces.  It was this thinking that prompted de Gaulle to remove France from
NATO in 1966.  This removal required France to develop her own defense force to
remain a power on the world stage.
In the background of all these events was the burgeoning French nuclear arsenal
and its development.  It was once again de Gaulle who urged the government of the
Fourth Republic to begin developing nuclear weapons.  De Gaulle had returned to power
in 1958 and was the one who ordered the first French nuclear weapon to be detonated.
Using the arguments that France needed to be able to defend itself against any threat, de
Gaulle envisioned and set to working on creating the force de frappe.  This would afford
the French not only international respect, but also allow the French a bigger chip at the
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bargaining table as well as providing for France’s ultimate defense in case of attack by
any foreign country.  Before he left office, de Gaulle laid the groundwork for an upgrade
to the force de frappe to make it more deadly and respected.  No longer would the nuclear
arsenal of France have to be delivered by jets; now it would be deliverable by ballistic
missiles.  De Gaulle resigned from office soon after the decision to strengthen the force
de frappe, but he left an enduring mark on French nuclear policy.
One aspect that needs to be mentioned is the growing French need for uranium.
With de Gaulle’s insistence on the development of the force de frappe, France needed
uranium.  But more important to the French need for uranium than the military uses of
nuclear energy were the civilian uses.  The civilian and military nuclear programs were
managerially integrated, and both represented thrusts in the general direction of political
independence from allied military power and other countries’ energy resources,
respectively.  France had an increasing number of nuclear power plants under order and
under construction.  France itself had a moderate amount of uranium for military
purposes, but it would not be enough to meet the needs of France’s upcoming fleet of
commercial reactors.  Thus France needed to find more uranium than it had at home, but
there was a small catch.  De Gaulle and other French leaders did not want to depend on
any other major foreign country for this uranium.  Political independence from allied
sources precludes reliance on North American sources, and Australian unease with
nuclear testing in the Pacific made it a potentially unreliable source.  Thus France needed
a source of uranium that it could control so that its supply would always remain un-
interrupted.  To solve the French dilemma, French leaders began to look to her African
colonies.
In particular, two of the French colonies looked extremely promising in the
acquisition of uranium, Niger and Gabon.  It was in 1956 that uranium was actually
discovered in Gabon, exploration for uranium had begun there years earlier.  It was also
in 1956 that exploration began in Niger for uranium, mining began there in 1970.  With
these two countries, France now had a reliable source of uranium, until independence
came along.
With France having to give the African countries of Niger and Gabon their formal
political independence, the French were in a bind with regard to uranium.  However, the
French used the ties it would create with all of its former colonies to make sure that it
would continue to receive uranium from both Niger and Gabon.  This is evident in that all
of the companies that were mining uranium, SOMAIR and COMINAK in Niger and
COMUF in Gabon, were majority owned by COGEMA, the French nuclear fuel
company.  The French now had what they wanted, a source of uranium for its military
and civilian nuclear energy programs that was very reliable.  But how stable were the
countries of Niger and Gabon?
As it turns out, because of the French, Gabon was very stable.  The only major
event that has marred the stability of Gabon, was an unsuccessful coup in 1964.  It was
during this coup that, some Gabonese military officers ousted Leon Mba, the French
installed leader of Gabon, from power.  A new provisional government was created but it
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lasted only a day.  France sent in some of its military forces to restore Leon Mba to
power.  The French claimed that the Vice-President of Gabon enacted the French-
Gabonese defense agreement and France had sent troops in under those auspices.
However, this could not have possibly happened because the same Vice-President was
with the American ambassador to Gabon until after the French troops had landed.  Why
would the French break international law and risk international wrath for the under-
developed country of Gabon?  Perhaps France wanted to keep its supply of uranium
constant and unaffected.
On the other hand, Niger has been one of the most unstable countries in Africa
since its independence.  When Niger faced a coup d’etat in 1974 that deposed its French
chosen leader, Hamani Diori France was notoriously absent.  There was no French
military intervention to restore Diori to power.  At this time, Niger had begun to produce
uranium for France, were the French not concerned with this turn of events?
However, the answer is a simple one, the French were facing their own political
crisis at the time.  The coup occurred during the period of time after the death of Georges
Pompidou but before a new President of France was elected.  So military intervention
could have occurred but the French were preoccupied with the upcoming election.  By
the time that the election was completed and Giscard d’Estaing was entrenched in power
in France, Colonel Kountche was also firmly entrenched in Niger.  Col. Kountche also
pursued a close relationship with France, attending Francophone Summits and keeping
Niger’s uranium flowing to France.  So in this special case, the fact that the French were
facing their own political crisis and the fact that by the time it was over the new
government in Niger had become trusted in France was the cause for the lack of
deployment of French troops to overturn the coup in Niger in 1974.
Overall, the desire for uranium from a dependable market source that the French
could control led to the French actions in Niger and Gabon.  Charles de Gaulle’s main
philosophy was for France to be independent from all other countries, especially the
superpowers.  This meant militarily and economically independent.  In order to be
militarily independent France developed the force de frappe.  France also was to be
energy independent and thus began construction of a vast number of nuclear power
plants.  Both the force de frappe and the new power plants needed uranium to become
active and viable.  Thus in order to be independent France needed uranium.  To buy this
uranium from the US or any other country France could not control would defeat the
purpose of acquiring the uranium at all.  So France turned to her former colonies where
she still had means to influence the governments in power there.  In Niger and Gabon,
France was able to obtain the uranium it needed to be independent, but more importantly,
France could control these sources of uranium through the Ministry of Co-Operation, the
defense and technical agreements, and the Franc Zone.  If something threatened the
stability of those governments, but more importantly the mining operations, France sent
in troops to intervene.  It is inconceivable to think that the need for uranium that France
felt did not play a role in determining French foreign policy in Africa.
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                                         Conclusion                                                                 .
France and Africa have been intertwined for over the last three hundred years.  Of all the
European colonizing nations, the French have held their former African colonies closer
than the British, Dutch, Germans or Portuguese have.  One of the many commodities that
has bound the French to their former African colonies of Niger and Gabon has been
uranium.  France has needed uranium not only for its nuclear weapons development and
maintenance but also to run the numerous reactors that provide the country with the
majority of its energy.  Some larger non-nuclear weapon states, notably Japan and
Germany, have bought the excess uranium that they have needed on the open market,
France was reluctant to do so because of policies shaped by its own version of a turbulent
history.
In particular, historical events have shaped the French leaders who have
determined the course of French military and foreign policy.  The one French leader who
has dominated the nuclear course that France has trod was Charles de Gaulle.  De
Gaulle’s insistence that France remain independent both militarily and with respect to
economic strategic materials, is due to events in French history.  These events, such as
the British abandonment at Dunkirk, the lack of U.S. support during the Suez crisis, and
change in NATO and U.S. policy in case of an invasion of Europe by the Soviets, caused
de Gaulle and France to strive for military and energy independence.
Because of a desire for a higher level of military and energy independence than
other European NATO members, France needed a reliable source of uranium that it could
control.  This was achieved through the many links that connected France to her former
colonies of Niger and Gabon.  These countries allowed COGEMA, the French nuclear
fuel company, to maintain majority control in the companies that mined uranium in Niger
and Gabon.  Thus, France’s supply of uranium would remain steady and unaffected by
any fluctuations in the market price of uranium.
However, when events arose in Gabon in 1964 that could affect the procurement
of uranium from Africa, France intervened.  Not only would they intervene, they would
do it without the request of anyone in the country in question and in violation of
international law.  At the least, these interventions were seen as French tampering with
the internal politics of a foreign nation.  In 1974, a temporarily distracted Frace stood by
during instability in Niger, but as it turned out this instability did not lead to a halt in the
flow of uranium from Niger to France.  In any case, the uranium flow to France from
Niger and Gabon could not be allowed to cease.  The French needed the uranium for their
nuclear weapons and their nuclear power plants.
After examining the events surrounding France, Africa (Niger and Gabon
particularly), uranium mining, Charles de Gaulle and French foreign policy only one
conclusion can be drawn.  French foreign policy towards Africa was affected by the
desire of France to stay militarily and economically independent, and thereby the need to
obtain uranium.  However, the degree or extent to which the need for this commodity
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shaped French foreign policy can only be speculated upon.  While the need to procure
uranium was probably not the most influential factor in shaping French foreign policy
towards Africa, given the larger economic and cultural issues a stake it did play a key
role and cannot be neglected.
Recently, the French foreign policy towards Africa has changed.  This change in
policy has resulted in the combination of the French Ministry’s of Co-operation and
Foreign Affairs, the withdrawal of French soldiers and civilians from Africa, and the
reduction in financial assistance from France to her former colonies.  These minor
changes in policy could be indicative of a larger change in French foreign policy towards
Africa.
Now it is possible for France to evolve beyond its traditional neocolonial policy
towards its former colonies in Africa.  Four key events have allowed the French to begin
to develop a new policy.  First, the French now have the ability to obtain uranium from
the global market.  For various reasons the French were either unable to unwilling to do
this in the past.  Second, there has been a generational change of French politicians.  The
death of Jacques Foccart, who is considered to be the father of the Francophone system in
Africa has allowed France to move away from its traditional policy towards those
Francophone countries in Africa.  The third event is France’s increasing participation in
coordinated European foreign policy.  No longer does France have free reign with their
African policies, now France must coordinate its foreign policy in Africa with that of the
rest of the countries in the EU.  Finally, the French involvement in the genocide in
Rwanda has tremendously affected French policy towards Africa.  The pressures felt by
French leaders both internally from France and externally, over the French role in the
genocide has affected how the French will deal with African countries in the future.  As
stated, French access to global uranium markets was necessary step in order to allow the
French to change their foreign policy towards Africa.  What is unclear is how much
change in French foreign policy will occur.  Nevertheless, the French access to global
uranium markets needed to occur before any change in French foreign policy towards
Africa could occur.
39
                                         Notes                                                                          .
1.  Elecnuc.  Les Centrales Nucleaires Dans Le Monde.  Commissariat a
l’energie atomique.  Gif-sur-Yvette, France, 2000.
2. Electricite de France.  < http://www.edf.fr/htm/en>  2001.
3. Ibid.
4.  Elecnuc.  Les Centrales Nucleaires Dans Le Monde.  Commissariat a
l’energie atomique.  Gif-sur-Yvette, France, 2000.
5.  Annual Report 1999.  COGEMA Inc.
<http://www.cogema.com/index_gb.html> 2001.
6.  Uranium 1999 Resources Production and Demand.  Nuclear Energy
Agency and  Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development.  Paris,
France, 2000.
7.  Annual Report 1999.  COGEMA Inc.
<http://www.cogema.com/index_gb.html> 2001.
8.  Uranium 1999 Resources Production and Demand.  Nuclear Energy
Agency and  Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development.  Paris,
France, 2000.
9.  Informations Utiles.  Commissariat a l’energie atomique.  Gif-sur-
Yvette, France, 2000.
10.  Annual Report 1999.  COGEMA Inc.
<http://www.cogema.com/index_gb.html> 2001.
11.  Ibid.
12.  Uranium 1999 Resources Production and Demand.  Nuclear Energy
Agency and  Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development.  Paris,
France, 2000.
13.  Ibid.




17.  Saxena, S.C.  Politics in Africa.  Kalinga Publications.  New Delhi,
India, 1993.
18.  Webster, J.B, Boahen, A.A, and M. Tidy.  The Revolutionary Years.
West Africa since 1800.  Longman Group Ltd.  Essex, England, 1980.
19.  Chipman, John.  French Power in Africa.  Basil Blackwell, Inc.
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1989.
20.  Ibid.
21.  Rouvez, Alain.  Disconsolate Empires.  French, British and Belgian
Military Involvement in Post-Colonial Sub-Saharan Africa.  University Press of
America, Inc.  Lanham, Maryland, 1994.
22.  Chipman, John.  French Power in Africa.  Basil Blackwell, Inc.
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1989.
40
23.  Duignan, Peter and Robert H. Jackson, Ed.  Politics and Government
in African States 1960-1985.  Hoover Instituition Press.  Stanford, California,
1986.
24.  Clark, John F. and David E. Gardinier, Eds.  Political Reform in
Francophone Africa.  Westview Press.  Boulder, Colorado, 1997.
25.  Chipman, John.  French Power in Africa.  Basil Blackwell, Inc.
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1989.
26.  Rouvez, Alain.  Disconsolate Empires.  French, British and Belgian
Military Involvement in Post-Colonial Sub-Saharan Africa.  University Press of
America, Inc.  Lanham, Maryland, 1994.
27.  Ibid.
28.  Chipman, John.  French Power in Africa.  Basil Blackwell, Inc.
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1989.
29.  Rouvez, Alain.  Disconsolate Empires.  French, British and Belgian
Military Involvement in Post-Colonial Sub-Saharan Africa.  University Press of
America, Inc.  Lanham, Maryland, 1994.
30.  Saint-Paul, Marc Aicardi de.  Gabon, the Development of a Nation.
Routledge.  New York City, New York, 1987.
31.  Barnes, James F.  Gabon, Beyond the Colonial Legacy.  Westview
Press.  Boulder, Colorado, 1992.
32.  Saint-Paul, Marc Aicardi de.  Gabon, the Development of a Nation.
Routledge.  New York City, New York, 1987.
33.  Barnes, James F.  Gabon, Beyond the Colonial Legacy.  Westview
Press.  Boulder, Colorado, 1992.
34.  Saint-Paul, Marc Aicardi de.  Gabon, the Development of a Nation.
Routledge.  New York City, New York, 1987.
35.  Ibid.
36.  Barnes, James F.  Gabon, Beyond the Colonial Legacy.  Westview
Press.  Boulder, Colorado, 1992.
37.  Ibid.
38.  Ibid.
39.  Gardinier, David E.  Historical Dictionary of Gabon.  The Scarecrow
Press, Inc.  Metuchen, New Jersey, 1981.
40.  Saint-Paul, Marc Aicardi de.  Gabon, the Development of a Nation.
Routledge.  New York City, New York, 1987.
41.  Barnes, James F.  Gabon, Beyond the Colonial Legacy.  Westview
Press.  Boulder, Colorado, 1992.
42.  Ibid.
43.  Decalo, Samuel.  The Stable Minority: Civilian Rule in Africa, 1960-
1990.  Florida Academic Press Books.  Gainesville, Florida, 1998.
44.  Uranium 1999-1975 Resources Production and Demand.  Nuclear
Energy Agency and  Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development.
Paris, France, 2000.
45.  Saint-Paul, Marc Aicardi de.  Gabon, the Development of a Nation.
Routledge.  New York City, New York, 1987.
41
46.  Barnes, James F.  Gabon, Beyond the Colonial Legacy.  Westview
Press.  Boulder, Colorado, 1992.
47.  Saint-Paul, Marc Aicardi de.  Gabon, the Development of a Nation.
Routledge.  New York City, New York, 1987.
48.  Decalo, Samuel.  The Stable Minority: Civilian Rule in Africa, 1960-
1990.  Florida Academic Press Books.  Gainesville, Florida, 1998.
49.  Gardinier, David E.  Historical Dictionary of Gabon.  The Scarecrow
Press, Inc.  Metuchen, New Jersey, 1981.
50.  Decalo, Samuel.  The Stable Minority: Civilian Rule in Africa, 1960-
1990.  Florida Academic Press Books.  Gainesville, Florida, 1998.
51.  Darlington, Charles and Alice.  African Betrayal.  David McKay
Company, Inc.  New York City, New York, 1968.
52.  Gardinier, David E.  Historical Dictionary of Gabon.  The Scarecrow
Press, Inc.  Metuchen, New Jersey, 1981.
53.  Barnes, James F.  Gabon, Beyond the Colonial Legacy.  Westview
Press.  Boulder, Colorado, 1992.
54.  Gardinier, David E.  Historical Dictionary of Gabon.  The Scarecrow
Press, Inc.  Metuchen, New Jersey, 1981.
55.  Darlington, Charles and Alice.  African Betrayal.  David McKay
Company, Inc.  New York City, New York, 1968.
56.  Barde, Ibrahim.  Mahamane Ousmane, Power and Democracy in
Niger.  RAI Communications. Kano, Nigeria, 1996.
57.  Rouvez, Alain.  Disconsolate Empires.  French, British and Belgian
Military Involvement in Post-Colonial Sub-Saharan Africa.  University Press of
America, Inc.  Lanham, Maryland, 1994.
58.  Uranium 1999-1975 Resources Production and Demand.  Nuclear
Energy Agency and  Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development.
Paris, France, 2000.
59.  Ibid.
60.  Barde, Ibrahim.  Mahamane Ousmane, Power and Democracy in
Niger.  RAI Communications. Kano, Nigeria, 1996.
61.  Chipman, John.  French Power in Africa.  Basil Blackwell, Inc.
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1989.
62.  Barde, Ibrahim.  Mahamane Ousmane, Power and Democracy in
Niger.  RAI Communications. Kano, Nigeria, 1996.
63.  Ibid.
64.  Ibid.
65.  Uranium 1999 Resources Production and Demand.  Nuclear Energy
Agency and  Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development.  Paris,
France, 2000.
66.  Gough, Hugh and John Horne, ed.  De Gaulle and Twentieth Century
France.  Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc.  New York City, New York, 1994.
42
67.  Berstein, Serge.  The Republic of de Gaulle, 1958-1969.  Cambridge
University Press.  New York City, New York, 1993.
68.  Gough, Hugh and John Horne, ed.  De Gaulle and Twentieth Century
France.  Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc.  New York City, New York, 1994.
69.  Cerny, Phillip G.  The Politics of Grandeur.  Cambridge University
Press.  New York City, New York, 1980.
70.  Chuter, David.  Humanity’s Soldier, France and International
Security, 1919-2001.  Bergham Books.  Providence, Rhode Island, 1996.
71.  Gough, Hugh and John Horne, ed.  De Gaulle and Twentieth Century
France.  Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc.  New York City, New York, 1994.
72.  Berstein, Serge.  The Republic of de Gaulle, 1958-1969.  Cambridge
University Press.  New York City, New York, 1993.
73.  Prototype International Data Centre.  Center for Monitoring Research.
Arlington, Virginia.  <http://www.pidc.org/web-bin/bycountry?fra>  2001.
74.  Uranium Information Centre Ltd.  Corporate Website.  GPO Box
1649N, Melbourne 3001, Australia.  <http://www.uic.com.au/index.htm>  2001.
75.  Ibid.
76.  Prototype International Data Centre.  Center for Monitoring Research.
Arlington, Virginia.  <http://www.pidc.org/web-bin/bycountry?fra>  2001.
77.  Uranium Information Centre Ltd.  Corporate Website.  GPO Box
1649N, Melbourne 3001, Australia.  <http://www.uic.com.au/index.htm>  2001.
78.  Sancton, Thomas.  Trouble in Paradise.  Time Magazine.  Volume
146, No. 12.  Time Inc.  Sept. 18, 1995.
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/archive/1995/950918/950918.weapons.htm> 2001.
79.  Ibid.
80.  Martin, Guy.  France’s African Policy in Transition:  Disengagement
and Redeployment.  University of Virginia, 2000.
81.  Ibid.
82.  Kolodziej, Edward A.  The Great Powers and Genocide:  Lessons
from Rwanda.  Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security.
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, March 2000.
83.  Martin, Guy.  France’s African Policy in Transition:  Disengagement
and Redeployment.  University of Virginia, 2000.
43
VITA
Nicholas Robert Pederson was born in Bloomington, Illinois on June 19th, 1977, which
happened to be Father’s Day that year.  After graduating from Normal Community High
School in 1995, he chose to attend the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and
major in Nuclear Engineering.  After completing his rigorous undergraduate curriculum,
Nicholas graduated in May 1999 with his B.S. in Nuclear, Plasma and Radiological
Engineering.  Not knowing quite what to do with himself, he chose to attend graduate
school also at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.  After initially studying
radiological engineering and the use of radioisotopes for medical imaging, Nick decided
that was not his forte.  So after a semester and a half he changed his focus and decided to
become involved with Dr. Singer and his Arms Control, Disarmament, and International
Security group on campus.  After painstakingly completing his Thesis, Nick graduated
with his M.S. in Nuclear Engineering in May 2001.  His future plans include attending
the Officer Training School for the United States Air Force and commissioning as a
second lieutenant in the Air Force.
